Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (Publ) v. Competition Commission of India & Another

High Court of Delhi at New Delhi | Decided: 30 March 2016 W.P.(C) No. 464/2014 & W.P.(C) No. 1006/2014 Bench: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vibhu Bakhru

Background

Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (Publ), a company incorporated under the laws of Sweden and one of the world’s largest telecommunications companies, filed two writ petitions challenging orders passed by the Competition Commission of India under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act, 2002. The impugned order dated 12 November 2013 was passed pursuant to information filed by Micromax Informatics Limited and is the subject matter of W.P.(C) No. 464/2014. The impugned order dated 16 January 2014 was passed pursuant to information filed by Intex Technologies (India) Limited and is the subject matter of W.P.(C) No. 1006/2014. Both petitions raised similar controversies and were heard together.

Ericsson holds a large portfolio of Standard Essential Patents in respect of technologies used in mobile handsets and network stations including technologies relating to 2G, 3G and 4G networks. Standard Essential Patents are patents covering technologies that have been accepted as industry standards by Standard Setting Organisations, such that any device compliant with the established standard necessarily requires a licence from the patent holder. Ericsson’s SEPs in question relate to three technology groups covering the GSM, 3G and EDGE standards. These include eight patents registered in India relating to Adaptive Multi-Rate speech codec technology, multi-service handling by a single mobile station, mobile radio communication systems and Enhanced Data Rates for GSM Evolution. Ericsson, as a member of the European Telecommunications Standard Institute, had given an irrevocable undertaking pursuant to clause 6.1 of the ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy to offer licences for its SEPs on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory terms to all interested parties.

Micromax Informatics Limited is an Indian company and one of the largest mobile handset manufacturers in the world with a product portfolio of over 60 models of mobile phones. Intex Technologies India Limited is a company with a pan-India presence dealing in mobile phones and various electronic products, with mobile phone business contributing approximately 65 percent of its revenues. Both Micromax and Intex manufactured and sold mobile devices incorporating the technologies standardised by ETSI for GSM, 3G and EDGE communications.

Ericsson alleged that both Micromax and Intex had infringed its SEPs and sought to negotiate Patent Licensing Agreements with each of them on FRAND terms. Protracted negotiations between Ericsson and Micromax spanning from November 2009 through 2013 including execution of a Non-Disclosure Agreement, appointment of a mediator in the form of Justice A.P. Shah, Retired Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court and interim royalty arrangements failed to produce a final licensing agreement. Similarly, negotiations between Ericsson and Intex spanning from December 2008 through 2013 were unsuccessful. Ericsson thereafter filed patent infringement suits against Micromax in CS(OS) No. 442/2013 and against Intex in CS(OS) No. 1045/2014 before the Delhi High Court, seeking injunctions, discovery orders, customs inspections and interim royalty payments.

Aggrieved by Ericsson’s conduct, Micromax filed information before the CCI on 24 June 2013 under Section 19(1)(a) of the Competition Act, alleging that Ericsson had abused its dominant position as a holder of SEPs by demanding unfair and excessive royalty rates bearing no relation to Indian commercial realities, by using the threat of interim injunctions and customs seizures to coerce Micromax into accepting unreasonable licensing terms and by threatening to complain to the Securities and Exchange Board of India in connection with Micromax’s proposed Initial Public Offering in order to pressurise Micromax. Intex filed similar information before the CCI on 30 September 2013, alleging that Ericsson had demanded exorbitant and discriminatory royalties calculated on the value of the end product rather than the component incorporating the patented technology, had insisted on bundled licensing of its entire SEP portfolio without offering individual patent rates, had conducted licensing negotiations in an opaque and non-transparent manner and had failed to disclose the patents allegedly infringed before requiring execution of a Non-Disclosure Agreement containing onerous jurisdictional clauses.

By its impugned order dated 12 November 2013 in Case No. 50/2013 relating to Micromax’s complaint, the CCI formed a prima facie view that Ericsson enjoyed complete dominance over present and prospective licensees in the relevant market in view of the absence of any non-infringing technological alternative to its SEPs, that the royalty rates charged by Ericsson bore no link to the patented product and were contrary to FRAND obligations and directed the Director General to investigate the matter under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act. By its impugned order dated 16 January 2014 in Case No. 76/2013, the CCI passed a similar order in respect of Intex’s complaint, clubbing it with the Micromax case for the purpose of investigation. Ericsson challenged both orders by way of writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, contending that the CCI entirely lacked jurisdiction to entertain complaints regarding royalty demands in respect of patented technologies, that the Patents Act was a special statute occupying the entire field in respect of abuse of patent rights and that the impugned orders were perverse and without application of mind.

Issues for Determination

• whether the writ petitions were maintainable at all, given that orders under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act directing the Director General to conduct an investigation are not final determinations of rights and do not give rise to civil consequences and given the Supreme Court’s ruling in Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. that such orders are administrative directions not subject to appeal at that stage.
• Whether Ericsson, as a proprietor of patents engaged in licensing those patents, constituted an enterprise within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the Competition Act and whether patents and patent licences constituted goods or services for the purposes of the Act, such that Section 4 of the Competition Act could have any application to Ericsson’s conduct.
• whether the Patents Act, 1970 constituted a special statute vis-à-vis the Competition Act, 2002 such that it occupied the entire legislative field in respect of anti-competitive practices by a patent holder and whether the provisions of the Patents Act providing for compulsory licences and other remedies in respect of abuse of patent rights excluded the jurisdiction of the CCI to entertain complaints relating to the same subject matter under the Competition Act.
• Whether there was any irreconcilable conflict or repugnancy between the Patents Act, 1970 and the Competition Act, 2002 in respect of their anti-abuse provisions, such that the Patents Act must prevail notwithstanding the non-obstante clause in Section 60 of the Competition Act.
• whether the allegations made by Micromax and Intex in their complaints could, if accepted as true, constitute a prima facie case of abuse of dominant position under Section 4 of the Competition Act and in particular whether the conduct of an SEP holder in demanding supra-competitive royalties, threatening injunctive action and seeking to coerce acceptance of non-FRAND terms could in principle amount to abuse of dominance.
• whether the pendency of infringement suits filed by Ericsson against Micromax and Intex before the Delhi High Court precluded the CCI from entertaining complaints on the same subject matter, given the provisions of Section 61 of the Competition Act which bar civil courts from entertaining suits in respect of matters within the domain of the CCI or the Competition Appellate Tribunal.
• Whether Micromax and Intex, having denied infringement of Ericsson’s patents in the pending suits, could simultaneously maintain complaints before the CCI which were premised on Ericsson being the proprietor of valid SEPs.
• Whether the impugned orders were perverse or without application of mind such as to warrant interference in the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Key Holdings of the Court

1. The Court held that the writ petitions were maintainable. While orders under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act directing investigation are administrative in nature and not appealable as final determinations, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Steel Authority of India cannot be read as placing such orders beyond the reach of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Where a party challenges the jurisdiction of the CCI to pass such directions or where the directions are alleged to be perverse, the High Court may exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. In the present case, Ericsson’s challenge to the CCI’s jurisdiction involved a question of law that fell squarely within the limited scope of judicial review available in respect of directions under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act. The availability of an alternative remedy at a later stage of the proceedings did not disable the Court from entertaining the petition.
2. The Court held that Ericsson constituted an enterprise within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the Competition Act. Patents are property specifically movable, incorporeal property and fall within the definition of goods under the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, which defines goods as every kind of movable property other than actionable claims and money. The wide meaning of property endorsed by the Supreme Court in multiple decisions encompasses intangible and incorporeal rights including patents, copyrights and trademarks. Ericsson being engaged in activities that entail acquisition and control of patents was, therefore, an enterprise within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the Competition Act.
3. The Court held that the Patents Act, 1970 is a special statute vis-à-vis the Competition Act, 2002 insofar as matters relating to patents are concerned. The Patents Act provides not only for the grant of patent rights but also for the exercise and enforcement of those rights as well as remedies in the event of abuse of those rights, including through the compulsory licensing regime under Chapter XVI. The Competition Act on the other hand is directed more generally to prohibiting anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant position and regulation of combinations. In cases of irreconcilable conflict between the two Acts in respect of patent matters, the Patents Act as the special statute would prevail.
4. The Court held that there was no irreconcilable conflict or repugnancy between the Competition Act and the Patents Act in respect of their respective anti-abuse provisions. The remedies available under Section 27 of the Competition Act for abuse of dominant position are materially different from the remedy of compulsory licence available under Section 84 of the Patents Act and the two are not mutually exclusive grant of one is not destructive of the other. The provisions of Sections 21 and 21A of the Competition Act, which provide for references between the CCI and other statutory authorities where their orders may be inconsistent, confirm that the legislative intention was that the two statutes co-exist and be worked harmoniously and in tandem. Section 90(1)(ix) of the Patents Act, which permits the Controller to allow export of a patented product under a compulsory licence in cases where the licence is granted to remedy an anti-competitive practice determined after judicial or administrative process, expressly contemplates that findings of the CCI will be relevant in compulsory licence proceedings. In the absence of any irreconcilable conflict, the jurisdiction of the CCI to entertain complaints of abuse of dominance in respect of patent rights cannot be ousted.
5. The Court held that the jurisdiction of CCI to entertain the complaints of Micromax and Intex could not be excluded on the ground that the Patents Act provides adequate remedies for the grievances agitated. The remedies under the two enactments operate in different dimensions proceedings under Section 84 of the Patents Act provide a remedy to individual applicants seeking compulsory licences, while orders under Section 27 of the Competition Act are in rem and directed at terminating anti-competitive conduct in the market. An abuse of dominant position under Section 4 of the Competition Act is not a cause of action that can be made the subject of a civil suit before a civil court. The jurisdiction to determine such questions is vested exclusively in the CCI and the Competition Appellate Tribunal. Merely because certain facts relevant to a suit may also be relevant to a competition inquiry does not mean that a civil court adjudicates the competition question.
6. The Court held that the pendency of infringement suits filed by Ericsson did not preclude the CCI from entertaining the complaints of Micromax and Intex. The proceedings under the Competition Act are not in the nature of a private lis between the parties. The CCI’s function is to prevent and curb practices having an adverse effect on competition in India generally and its orders under Section 27 need not correspond to the relief sought by the informant in the private sense.
7. The Court held that Micromax and Intex were not precluded from maintaining complaints before the CCI premised on Ericsson being the proprietor of valid SEPs merely because they had denied infringement in the pending suits. The Competition Act proceedings are premised on the existence of SEPs held by Ericsson the very premise on which Ericsson itself asserts its rights. A potential licensee is not required to waive its right to challenge the validity of patents in order to assert that the patent holder has abused its dominant position in exercising those rights. Section 140(1)(d) of the Patents Act expressly provides that conditions in licences preventing challenges to the validity of patents are void, which confirms that a licensee retains the right to challenge patents. The doctrine of election has no application in these circumstances.
8. The Court held that in certain circumstances an SEP holder’s demand for supra-competitive royalties, imposition of unreasonable licensing terms and use of the threat of injunctive action to coerce acceptance of non-FRAND terms could in principle constitute abuse of dominant position under Section 4 of the Competition Act. The risk of injunctive action places an implementer in a position of severe bargaining disadvantage vis-à-vis an SEP holder. The conduct of Ericsson in threatening Micromax with complaints to SEBI in connection with its proposed IPO, if directed at pressuring Micromax to accept non-FRAND terms, could constitute abuse of dominance in certain circumstances. The CCI’s view that the complaints prima facie disclosed abuse of dominance was not perverse and this was not a case where no reasonable person could have formed such a view on the material before it.
9. The Court dismissed both writ petitions, vacated all interim orders and left the parties to bear their own costs. The Court expressly clarified that nothing stated in the judgment should be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the allegations made by Micromax and Intex all observations were confined to the question of CCI’s jurisdiction.

Statutory Provisions Involved

Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 prohibits any enterprise from abusing its dominant position. Sub-section 2 specifies that abuse of dominant position includes directly or indirectly imposing unfair or discriminatory conditions or prices in purchase or sale of goods or services, limiting or restricting production of goods or provision of services or technical or scientific development to the prejudice of consumers, indulging in practices resulting in denial of market access and making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance of supplementary obligations having no connection with the subject of the contracts. The Court examined in detail whether Ericsson’s conduct as an SEP holder could in principle fall within the scope of Section 4 and held that in certain circumstances it could.

Section 2(h) of the Competition Act, 2002 defines enterprise as a person or government department engaged in any activity relating to production, storage, supply, distribution, acquisition or control of articles or goods or the provision of services of any kind. The Court held that Ericsson’s activities relating to the acquisition and control of patents which are movable incorporeal property constituting goods brought it within this definition.

Section 19(1)(a) of the Competition Act, 2002 empowers any person, consumer, consumer association or trade association to file information before the CCI alleging contravention of Section 3 or Section 4 of the Act. Both Micromax and Intex had filed information under this provision.

Section 26(1) of the Competition Act, 2002 empowers the CCI, upon receipt of information or upon a reference, to form a prima facie opinion that there exists a case of violation of Section 3 or Section 4 and to direct the Director General to cause an investigation to be made into the matter. The nature and scope of such directions and the limited scope of judicial review available in respect of them was a central question before the Court.

Section 27 of the Competition Act, 2002 specifies the orders the CCI may pass where after inquiry it finds that any enterprise has abused its dominant position, including directing the enterprise to discontinue such abuse and not to re-enter such conduct and imposing penalties of up to ten percent of the average turnover for the last three preceding financial years. The Court emphasised that these remedies are materially different from the remedy of compulsory licence available under the Patents Act and are not mutually exclusive with the latter.

Section 60 of the Competition Act, 2002 provides that the provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. The Court held that this non-obstante clause must be read harmoniously with Section 62 of the Act and in the context of the Competition Act as a whole and cannot be construed to whittle down or abrogate the provisions of the Patents Act.

Section 61 of the Competition Act, 2002 bars civil courts from entertaining any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which the CCI or the Competition Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine. The Court applied this provision to hold that questions of abuse of dominant position are solely within the domain of the CCI and cannot be made the subject matter of a civil suit.

Section 62 of the Competition Act, 2002 provides that the provisions of the Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. The Court applied this provision alongside Section 60 to hold that the Competition Act is intended to co-exist with other statutes including the Patents Act.

Section 84 of the Patents Act, 1970 provides for grant of compulsory licences by the Controller of Patents at any time after the expiry of three years from the date of grant of a patent, on the grounds that the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the patented invention have not been satisfied, that the patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price or that the patented invention is not worked in the territory of India. Section 84(7) deems reasonable requirements of the public to be unsatisfied in various circumstances including where a patentee’s refusal to grant a licence on reasonable terms prejudices existing trade or industry or any person or class of persons trading or manufacturing in India. The Court held that the instances specified in Section 84(7) overlap with conduct that could constitute abuse of dominance under the Competition Act but that the remedies available are materially different and not mutually exclusive.

Section 90(1)(ix) of the Patents Act, 1970 provides that in settling the terms of a compulsory licence, the Controller shall permit export of the patented product where the licence is granted to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive. The Court identified this provision as expressly contemplating harmonious operation of the Competition Act and the Patents Act, with the Controller being required to take into account findings of anti-competitive conduct made by the CCI.

Section 140(1) of the Patents Act, 1970 declares void conditions in contracts or licences relating to patented articles or processes which have the effect of requiring exclusive grant back, preventing challenges to the validity of the patent or creating coercive package licensing. The Court applied clause (d) of Section 140(1) to hold that a potential licensee cannot be required to waive its right to challenge the validity of patents as a condition of asserting that a patent holder has abused its dominant position.

Section 3(5) of the Competition Act, 2002 provides that nothing in Section 3 shall restrict the right of any person to impose reasonable conditions as may be necessary for protecting rights conferred under the Patents Act, 1970 and other intellectual property statutes. The Court noted that the safe harbour under Section 3(5) is limited to reasonable conditions and does not extend to unreasonable anti-competitive agreements even if purportedly made in exercise of patent rights.

Sections 21 and 21A of the Competition Act, 2002 provide for mutual references between the CCI and other statutory authorities where orders proposed to be made by either may be contrary to the provisions of the other’s statute. The Court relied on these provisions as confirming the legislative intent that the Competition Act and other regulatory statutes including the Patents Act be worked harmoniously and in tandem.

Article 226 of the Constitution of India confers on High Courts the power to issue directions, orders or writs including writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition for the enforcement of fundamental rights and for any other purpose. The Court exercised this jurisdiction to examine the CCI’s orders while clarifying that the scope of such review is limited and does not extend to examining the merits of the allegations or the correctness of the CCI’s prima facie view on the facts.

Reasoning of the Court

The Court’s reasoning proceeded through six distinct analytical pathways each addressing a separate limb of Ericsson’s challenge to the CCI’s jurisdiction.

• On the maintainability question, the Court reasoned that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Steel Authority of India limited the right of appeal against Section 26(1) orders and characterised such orders as administrative rather than adjudicatory in nature, but did not and could not curtail the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Any order passed without jurisdiction or found to be perverse remains amenable to writ jurisdiction. The extensive and intrusive powers of the Director General in conducting an investigation including powers to summon witnesses, compel production of documents and seize records meant that the commencement of investigation was not without consequence for the party under investigation. Ericsson’s challenge raised a genuine jurisdictional question that could not await final determination before being agitated.
• On the question of whether patents constitute goods and Ericsson constitutes an enterprise, the Court conducted a careful textual analysis of the definition of enterprise in Section 2(h), the definition of goods in Section 2(i) of the Competition Act as incorporating the Sale of Goods Act definition and the meaning of movable property under the General Clauses Act. Tracing the law through the Supreme Court’s decisions in Vikas Sales Corporation v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, the Court concluded that property including incorporeal property such as patents falls within the definition of goods. Ericsson, being engaged in the acquisition and control of such property, was therefore an enterprise.
• On the special statute question, the Court applied the well-established principle that an enactment may be special in relation to one statute and general in relation to another. The Court examined the legislative histories of both the Patents Act and the Competition Act in detail including the Ayyangar Committee Report, the speeches of the Minister of Commerce introducing the Patents Amendment Bill 2002 and the recommendations of the Raghavan High Level Committee and found that both the Patents Act amendments of 2002 and 2005 and the Competition Act of 2002 were enacted against the backdrop of India’s obligations under the TRIPS Agreement and the Parliament’s awareness that anti-competitive practices in relation to patents required specific legislative attention. The fact that the Parliament had chosen to address certain patent-specific abuses through compulsory licence provisions in the Patents Act did not mean that all anti-competitive conduct in respect of patents was excluded from the Competition Act’s reach. Where the two statutes can be harmoniously read and worked together which the Court found to be the case there is no occasion to treat the Patents Act as displacing the Competition Act.
• The Court devoted particular attention to Sections 21, 21A and 90(1)(ix) of the respective Acts as indicators of legislative intent. Sections 21 and 21A provide an institutional mechanism for the CCI and other statutory authorities to seek each other’s opinion before passing potentially inconsistent orders. Section 90(1)(ix) of the Patents Act expressly requires the Controller to permit export of a patented product in compulsory licences granted to remedy anti-competitive conduct determined by judicial or administrative process which plainly includes CCI proceedings. These provisions demonstrated to the Court that the Parliament had consciously designed the two statutes to operate concurrently and harmoniously rather than to occupy mutually exclusive fields.
• On the question of whether the allegations could constitute abuse of dominance, the Court drew extensively on comparative jurisprudence from the United States and the European Union. It referred to the United States Court of Appeals decision in Broadcom v. Qualcomm for the proposition that an SEP holder’s false promise to license on FRAND terms coupled with the SSO’s reliance thereon and subsequent breach is actionable anti-competitive conduct. It referred to the Federal Trade Commission’s findings against Rambus Inc. for deliberate distortion of the standard setting process. Most significantly it referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union’s landmark ruling in Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. v. ZTE Corp., delivered in July 2015, for the proposition that a refusal by an SEP holder to grant licences on FRAND terms may constitute abuse within the meaning of Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and that an SEP holder is required to discharge specific procedural obligations including prior notification to the alleged infringer and a written FRAND offer before bringing an action for prohibitory injunction. The Court held that Section 4 of the Competition Act is broadly analogous to Article 102 of TFEU in its anti-abuse provisions and that the same analysis applies in principle under Indian competition law.
• On the question of unwilling licensees, the Court departed from the narrower approach of the German Federal Court in the Orange Book Standard case and adopted the approach of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Huawei Technologies, holding that a potential licensee is not required to waive its right to challenge the validity of patents in order to be treated as a willing licensee or to maintain a complaint of abuse of dominance before the CCI. Section 140(1)(d) of the Patents Act which expressly voids conditions in patent licences preventing challenges to validity confirmed this conclusion.
• On perversity, the Court, while noting that Ericsson had made genuine efforts over several years to arrive at negotiated FRAND agreements with both Micromax and Intex, held that it could not substitute its view for that of the CCI on the prima facie question. The CCI’s conclusion that the complaints disclosed prima facie abuse of dominance was not so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have formed such a view on the material before it. The Court accordingly declined to interfere on the ground of perversity.

Doctrinal Significance

The Ericsson v. CCI judgment is one of the most significant decisions in Indian competition and patent law and its doctrinal importance operates across several distinct dimensions.

The judgment definitively resolves the question of whether the CCI has jurisdiction to entertain complaints alleging abuse of dominant position by a patent holder in the exercise of its patent rights. By holding that there is no irreconcilable conflict between the Patents Act and the Competition Act and that the two statutes operate in addition to each other and not in derogation, the Court established that compulsory licence proceedings under Section 84 of the Patents Act and competition proceedings under Section 4 of the Competition Act provide distinct and non-exclusive remedies that may be pursued concurrently. This resolution of the jurisdictional conflict is of fundamental importance to the emerging framework of SEP licensing disputes in India.

The judgment is the first significant Indian decision to examine the interface between standard essential patents and competition law in depth. By holding that the conduct of an SEP holder including demands for supra-competitive royalties, use of injunctive threats to coerce acceptance of non-FRAND terms and leveraging regulatory complaints to pressurise potential licensees can in principle constitute abuse of dominant position under Section 4 of the Competition Act, the Court brought Indian competition law broadly into alignment with the approach of the European Union under Article 102 of TFEU and the United States antitrust framework under the Sherman Act.

The judgment’s treatment of patents as goods within the meaning of the Competition Act is also doctrinally significant. By tracing the expansive meaning of property through the General Clauses Act, the Sale of Goods Act and multiple Supreme Court decisions, the Court provided a clear and principled basis for treating patent holders engaged in the acquisition and licensing of patents as enterprises within the scope of the Competition Act a question that had generated considerable uncertainty before this judgment.

The Court’s discussion of the willing licensee concept is important for the law and practice of FRAND licensing disputes. By rejecting the requirement derived from the German Orange Book Standard case that a potential licensee must waive its right to challenge patent validity in order to be treated as willing and by aligning instead with the Court of Justice of the European Union’s holding in Huawei Technologies, the judgment provides Indian licensees with greater procedural protection in FRAND negotiations and competition proceedings. The reinforcement of this position by reference to Section 140(1)(d) of the Patents Act anchors the analysis in the domestic statutory framework.

The judgment’s contribution to the law of judicial review of CCI orders is also significant. By clarifying that while Section 26(1) orders directing investigation are not final determinations and are not appealable at that stage, they nonetheless remain subject to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on grounds of jurisdictional error or perversity, the Court preserved an important constitutional safeguard for parties subjected to competition investigations without disrupting the statutory scheme of the Competition Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Steel Authority of India.

Finally, the Ericsson v. CCI judgment has had a substantial practical impact on the framework for SEP licensing disputes in India. It has provided the foundation for subsequent cases addressing FRAND determination, royalty calculation methodologies and the interface between patent enforcement and competition law in the Indian telecommunications sector. The principles it established particularly on the concurrent operation of the Patents Act and the Competition Act and on the potential for SEP holders’ conduct to constitute abuse of dominance continue to shape both regulatory practice and judicial thinking in this rapidly evolving area of law.

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