Online Copyright Infringement & Intermediary Liability

The internet has fundamentally altered the economics and architecture of creative expression. Content that once required physical manufacture, distribution and retail can now be reproduced, transmitted and accessed globally within seconds, at virtually no cost. This transformation has been a gift to creators and audiences alike – but it has also made large scale copyright infringement easier than at any point in the history of intellectual property law. A single infringing upload on a platform with hundreds of millions of users can strip a rights holder of revenue that would have taken years to accumulate through legitimate channels. The legal response to this challenge has unfolded across two distinct but interconnected tracks. The first concerns the substantive scope of copyright in the digital environment – what acts of reproduction; communication and distribution constitute infringement when they occur online.

The second concerns the liability of intermediaries – the platforms, internet service providers, search engines and hosting services through which digital content flows – for the infringing acts of their users. It is this second track that has generated the most sustained legislative and judicial activity and it is here that the doctrine of safe harbours has emerged as the central organizing principle of digital copyright law.

This article examines both tracks in depth, with particular attention to the Indian legal framework under the Copyright Act, 1957, its 2012 amendments and the Information Technology Act, 2000, as well as significant comparative developments from the United States and the European Union that have shaped global practice in this area.

The Nature of Online Copyright Infringement

Copyright infringement in the digital context is doctrinally continuous with its offline equivalent – an unauthorized exercise of one of the exclusive rights granted to the copyright holder – but its practical character is profoundly different. The exclusive rights relevant online are primarily the right to reproduce the work, the right to communicate the work to the public and the right to distribute copies. Each of these is engaged in ways that traditional copyright frameworks were not designed to anticipate.

Reproduction in the digital environment occurs at every stage of content transmission. When a user streams a film, the data packets that constitute the film are reproduced temporarily in the device’s memory. When a user downloads an image, a permanent copy is created on local storage. When a platform caches a webpage, it reproduces the content of that page on its servers. The question of which of these reproductions are actionable infringements and which fall within permitted acts – such as transient reproduction necessary for the technical process of transmission – has occupied legislators and courts for decades.

Communication to the public is the right most directly implicated by online distribution. Under Section 14 of the Copyright Act, 1957, the copyright in a literary, musical, dramatic or artistic work includes the right to communicate the work to the public. Section 2(ff) of the Act, introduced by the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012, defines “communication to the public” broadly to include making the work available by any means including broadcast, rebroadcast and communication through satellite or cable or any other means of simultaneous communication. This definition is technology-neutral and capable of encompassing streaming, live-casting and on-demand digital distribution, though its precise boundaries in specific factual contexts continue to be tested in litigation.

Distribution of copies in the digital environment raises the vexed question of whether a digital transmission constitutes a “distribution” of copies within the meaning of copyright statutes drafted around the concept of physical goods. In India, the right to issue copies to the public under Section 14(b) has generally been read to cover digital distribution, though the point has not been definitively resolved by the Supreme Court. International practice, including the WIPO Copyright Treaty, 1996 – to which India is not yet a formal party but whose standards inform domestic interpretation – treats the “making available” right as encompassing online on-demand transmission.

The Indian Copyright Framework and the 2012 Amendments

The Copyright Act, 1957, as it stood before 2012, was inadequate to address the challenges of digital copyright. The legislative response was the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012, which introduced a series of changes directed specifically at the online environment, though the amendments addressed intermediary liability only indirectly and the primary statutory framework for platform liability continued to be the Information Technology Act, 2000.

The 2012 amendments made several important contributions to digital copyright. They introduced a statutory licence for broadcasting and making available recordings of literary and musical works, addressing the problem of royalty payment in digital music services. They strengthened the moral rights of authors and performers and introduced explicit recognition of performers’ rights in the digital context. They also amended the definition of “broadcast” to include communication through digital satellite channels and internet-based delivery platforms, extending the statutory licensing framework to these services.

The 2012 amendments also addressed the phenomenon of technological protection measures – the digital locks that rights holders place on content to prevent unauthorized access or reproduction. Section 65A of the Act, introduced by the amendment, prohibits circumvention of effective technological protection measures applied to a work. Section 65B prohibits removal of rights management information. These provisions bring Indian law into alignment with international standards under the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, though the scope of their application and available exceptions remain subjects of ongoing interpretation.

Intermediary Liability – The Central Problem

The liability of intermediaries for copyright infringement by their users is the most contested area of digital copyright law. The stakes are enormous: if platforms are held directly liable for every infringing act of every user, the economic model of the internet collapses. If they are immune, rights holders have no effective remedy against mass infringement that occurs through platforms that profit from user engagement.

The doctrinal tools for analyzing intermediary liability – contributory infringement, vicarious liability and inducement – were developed in the offline context and have been adapted, with varying degrees of success, to the digital environment. In India, these doctrines operate alongside the specific intermediary liability regime established by the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021.

Contributory infringement applies where an intermediary, with knowledge of infringing activity, materially contributes to that infringement. The knowledge element is critical – it distinguishes a passive conduit from an active participant. Vicarious liability applies where the intermediary has the right and ability to control the infringing activity and derives a direct financial benefit from it. Inducement liability, derived primarily from American jurisprudence, applies where the intermediary actively promotes or encourages infringement – an intent-based theory that can override safe harbour protection.

The Safe Harbour Framework under the IT Act, 2000

The Information Technology Act, 2000, as amended in 2008, establishes the primary safe harbour for internet intermediaries in India under Section 79. This provision grants immunity from liability to an intermediary for third-party information, data or communication links hosted on its platform, subject to conditions. The intermediary must not have initiated the transmission, selected the receiver, selected, or modified the information in the transmission. Additionally, the intermediary must observe due diligence, comply with government guidelines and upon receiving actual knowledge that a third party is using the platform to commit an unlawful act, act expeditiously to remove or disable access to the infringing content.

The architecture of Section 79 reflects the notice-and-take down model that has become the global default for intermediary liability. Rights holders notify the platform of infringing content; the platform removes it; the platform thereby preserves its immunity. The model distributes the burden of monitoring between rights holders (who identify infringing content) and platforms (who remove it upon notice), while placing primary responsibility for infringement on the direct infringer – the uploading user.

The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 significantly tightened the due diligence obligations of intermediaries, particularly for significant social media intermediaries with more than five million registered users. These obligations include grievance redressal mechanisms, appointment of compliance officers resident in India and mandatory proactive monitoring for certain categories of content – a requirement that sits in tension with the notice-and-take down model and has been challenged on constitutional grounds.

Landmark Indian Cases

The judicial development of online copyright and intermediary liability in India has been shaped by a series of significant decisions that have progressively defined the contours of the law.

MySpace Inc. v. Super Cassettes Industries Ltd. (2016) is the most important Indian decision on intermediary liability for copyright infringement. The Delhi High Court examined whether MySpace, a social networking platform, was liable for infringing music content uploaded by its users. The Court held that the safe harbour under Section 79 of the IT Act applied to MySpace and that the platform could not be held liable for user-uploaded content absent actual knowledge of specific infringements. Critically, the Court rejected the argument that a platform with a general awareness of widespread infringement has the requisite knowledge to lose its safe harbour. Actual knowledge of specific infringing material, communicated through a valid notice, was required. The Court also held that the burden of identifying specific infringing URLs rested with the rights holder, not with the platform. This decision established a robust safe harbour for platforms in India and aligned Indian law broadly with the American approach under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.

Amar Nath Sehgal v. Union of India (2005), though predating the digital copyright amendments, is foundational for understanding the moral rights framework that applies in the online environment. The Delhi High Court upheld the author’s moral right of integrity under Section 57 of the Copyright Act, establishing that rights holders have recourse against distortion or mutilation of their works – a principle directly applicable to digital manipulation and online modification of creative content.

Tips Industries Ltd. v. Wynk Music Ltd. (2019) raised the question of whether an on-demand music streaming service requires a licence under the statutory licensing provisions of Section 31D of the Copyright Act. The Bombay High Court held that Section 31D, which provides for a compulsory license for broadcasting, does not extend to on-demand streaming services. Streaming is not “broadcasting” within the meaning of the statute because it involves individual, interactive transmission on demand rather than simultaneous communication to the public. This decision has significant implications for the licensing economics of digital music platforms in India, as it means that streaming services cannot avail themselves of the compulsory rate fixed by the Copyright Board and must negotiate licenses directly with rights holders.

Christian Louboutin SAS v. Nakul Bajaj & Ors. (2018), while primarily a trademark case, contains important observations on the liability of online marketplaces that are equally applicable in the copyright context. The Delhi High Court distinguished between a platform that is a “mere conduit” – passively hosting third-party listings – and one that is an “active participant” in the transaction, exercising editorial control, providing additional services and presenting third-party goods as its own. An active participant cannot claim the safe harbour available to passive conduits. This distinction has been taken up in subsequent copyright litigation involving e-commerce platforms.

UTV Software Communications Ltd. v. 1337X.to & Ors. (2019) is the most significant Indian decision on website blocking as a remedy for online copyright infringement. The Delhi High Court granted dynamic injunctions against a series of “rogue websites” – platforms whose primary or dominant purpose was the facilitation of copyright infringement. The Court held that it had jurisdiction under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, read with Section 55 of the Copyright Act, to order internet service providers to block access to infringing websites. Importantly, the Court introduced the concept of the “dynamic injunction” – an order that could be extended to mirror sites and proxy sites of the blocked websites without requiring a fresh application, recognizing the ability of infringing platforms to reconstitute themselves at new domain addresses. The dynamic injunction mechanism has since been adopted in subsequent orders and has become an important tool for rights holders combating large-scale online piracy.

The American Framework – The DMCA Safe Harbour

A comparative understanding of United States law is essential because American platform practices and American judicial and legislative decisions shape the global operating environment for digital content. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 1998, established the safe harbour framework in the United States under Section 512. This framework provides four categories of safe harbour – for transitory digital network communications, system caching, information residing on systems at the direction of users and information location tools (search engines and hyperlinks).

The most litigated of these is the Section 512(c) safe harbour for user-uploaded content. A service provider qualifies for this safe harbour if it does not have actual knowledge of specific infringing material or, upon obtaining such knowledge, acts expeditiously to remove the material; if it does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity when it has the right and ability to control such activity; and if it responds expeditiously to valid take down notices from rights holders.

Viacom International Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. (2012) was the landmark American decision applying the DMCA safe harbour to a major video platform. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that YouTube was entitled to safe harbour protection for user-uploaded videos and that general knowledge of widespread infringement on the platform was not sufficient to disqualify the safe harbour. Specific knowledge of particular infringing clips was required. The Court remanded the case on the question of whether YouTube had “red flag” knowledge – awareness of facts that made infringement obvious – with respect to specific clips. The case ultimately settled, but it established the high threshold for actual and red flag knowledge that platforms must meet before losing their safe harbour.

Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC (2016) further refined the “red flag” knowledge standard, holding that a platform employee’s viewing of an infringing video does not automatically give rise to red flag knowledge unless the content was obviously infringing from a lay perspective. This decision made it practically very difficult for rights holders to establish the knowledge element required to overcome the safe harbour on the basis of employee awareness.

The adequacy of the DMCA safe harbour has been under sustained challenge from rights holders, who argue that the notice-and-take down system has been rendered ineffective by the phenomenon of “whack-a-mole” infringement – where infringing content reappears immediately after take down – and by the sheer volume of notices required to combat large-scale platform infringement. The Copyright Office conducted a comprehensive review of Section 512 and published its findings in 2020, concluding that the safe harbour system is significantly out of balance to the detriment of rights holders but stopping short of recommending wholesale legislative overhaul.

The European Union Approach – The Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive

The European Union took a significantly different direction with the adoption of Directive 2019/790 on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, commonly known as the DSM Directive. Article 17 of the Directive – formerly Article 13 of the proposal and the most controversial provision in the legislative history – fundamentally restructures the liability framework for platforms that host large amounts of user-uploaded content.

Under Article 17, online content-sharing service providers – platforms that store and provide public access to copyright-protected works uploaded by users and that optimize content for profit-making purposes – are directly liable for communication to the public of works uploaded by users. They cannot rely on the traditional intermediary safe harbour for this activity. To avoid liability, such platforms must obtain licenses from rights holders and where licenses cannot be obtained, must demonstrate that they have made best efforts to obtain authorization, made best efforts to ensure the unavailability of specific works for which rights holders have provided relevant and necessary information and acted expeditiously upon receiving a sufficiently substantiated notice to disable access to or remove the notified works and made best efforts to prevent their future upload.

In practice, Article 17 creates a powerful incentive for large platforms to deploy automated content recognition technology – the equivalent of Content ID, YouTube’s proprietary rights management system – to filter uploads against rights holder databases. Critics, including the European Data Protection Supervisor and numerous civil society organizations, argued that automated upload filters are technically incapable of accurate fair use and exceptions analysis, creating unacceptable risks of over-blocking legitimate expression. The Court of Justice of the European Union upheld the validity of Article 17 in Poland v. European Parliament and Council (Case C-401/19, 2022), rejecting the argument that mandatory upload filters violate freedom of expression, but emphasizing that member states must ensure that users can rely on exceptions and limitations when implementing the Directive.

Safe Harbour Conditions and Their Limits – The “Active” vs. “Passive” Distinction

Across jurisdictions, the availability of the safe harbour turns on whether the platform is characterized as a passive conduit or an active participant in the infringing activity. A passive conduit – one that stores content without knowledge of its nature does not shape or curate it and removes it promptly upon valid notice – is the paradigm beneficiary of safe harbour protection. An active participant – one that promotes infringing content, curates it for user discovery, derives specific financial benefit from it or has the technical means and fails to use them to prevent obvious infringement – may be excluded.

The difficulty is that modern content platforms do not fit either pole of this spectrum. They are simultaneously passive in the sense that they do not themselves select the specific content that users upload and active in the sense that their algorithms curate, recommend, priorities and monetize user-uploaded content in ways that can substantially amplify infringement. The question of where algorithmic curation falls on the active-passive spectrum has not been resolved by any court definitively and it is the central question driving legislative reform in both the United States and Europe.

The CJEU decision in L’Oréal SA v. eBay International AG (Case C-324/09, 2011), though a trademark case under the E-Commerce Directive, is widely cited in the copyright context for its articulation of the distinction between a “neutral” intermediary and one that has played an active role by optimizing the presentation of offers or promoting them. An active intermediary does not meet the threshold conditions for safe harbour protection. This analysis has been extended to copyright claims in subsequent proceedings across EU member states.

The Notice-and-Takedown Mechanism – Practical Operation and Challenges

The notice-and-takedown mechanism is the operational core of the safe harbour system across all major jurisdictions. In India, valid notice under Section 79(3) (b) of the IT Act triggers an obligation on the platform to act expeditiously to remove or disable access to the infringing content. The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines) Rules provide procedural requirements for this process, including acknowledgment timelines and grievance redressal obligations.

The practical challenges of the notice-and-takedown mechanism are substantial. For large rights holders – major music labels, film studios, publishing houses – the volume of infringing material online far exceeds any human capacity to identify and notify. The music industry sends tens of millions of take down notices annually through automated systems; the film industry operates similarly at scale. The administrative burden of managing this process, particularly in the absence of any “stay-down” obligation on platforms under Indian law, represents a significant ongoing cost that falls primarily on rights holders.

For smaller rights holders – individual authors, independent musicians, small publishers – the notice and take down mechanism is practically inaccessible. Identifying infringing URLs at scale requires technical resources and legal support that most independent creators do not have. The asymmetry between the ease with which infringing content is uploaded and the difficulty of having it removed represents one of the most significant unresolved equity problems of digital copyright law.

Counter-notification mechanisms – procedures by which users can challenge take down of their content introduce a further layer of complexity. Where a platform removes content in response to a rights holder notice and the uploading user counter-notifies claiming fair dealing or another exception, the platform is placed in the uncomfortable position of adjudicating a disputed rights claim without legal authority or competence to do so. In practice, most platforms restore removed content upon counter-notification, placing the burden back on the rights holder to commence litigation if it wishes to keep the content down.

The Role of Technological Protection Measures and Rights Management Information

Technological protection measures and rights management information are the two principal technical mechanisms by which rights holders seek to enforce copyright in the digital environment and both are now subject to statutory protection in India following the 2012 amendments.

Technological protection measures – encryption, digital rights management systems, access controls and copy-prevention technologies – protect both access to works and the ability to reproduce them. Section 65A of the Copyright Act prohibits circumvention of effective technological protection measures without authority of the rights holder, subject to exceptions permitted acts. The scope of the circumvention prohibition has been contested globally: where a technological protection measure restricts not only copying but also lawful use – including use that would be permitted under fair dealing or other exceptions – its inviolability may conflict with the policy of copyright exceptions.

Rights management information – data embedded in or attached to a work that identifies the work, its creator and the conditions of permitted use – is protected under Section 65B of the Copyright Act. Removal or alteration of rights management information without authority is prohibited. This provision is particularly important in the context of content scraped from original sources and distributed without attribution – a pervasive form of online infringement that strips creators not only of economic returns but also of the informational infrastructure needed to enforce their rights.

Fair Dealing in the Digital Context

No examination of digital copyright is complete without attention to fair dealing – the primary mechanism by which copyright’s exclusivity is balanced against the public interest in free access to information, education, commentary and criticism. Section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957 enumerates acts that do not constitute infringement, including fair dealing with any work for purposes of research, private study, criticism or review and the reporting of current events.

The Indian fair dealing framework is narrower than the American fair use doctrine in one critical respect – it is a defined list rather than an open-ended standard. The flexibility that American courts have exercised in extending fair use to transformative uses, aggregation, search indexing and other digital-era activities is not straightforwardly available under Section 52. However, Indian courts have interpreted the listed purposes with some flexibility and the Supreme Court in The Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of University of Oxford v. Rameshwari Photocopy Services (2016) – the famous Delhi photocopy case – affirmed a broad reading of fair dealing for educational purposes.

The photocopy case did not directly address digital reproduction, but its reasoning – that the purpose of copyright is to promote learning and access to knowledge and that fair dealing exceptions must be interpreted in light of this purpose – provides support for a contextually generous approach to digital fair dealing claims in educational and research settings. As educational institutions increasingly rely on digital course materials, learning management systems and open access platforms, the boundary between permissible fair dealing and infringing reproduction in the digital context will require further judicial attention.

Emerging Issues – Artificial Intelligence, Generative Content and Copyright

The rapid adoption of generative artificial intelligence systems – large language models, text-to-image generators, music synthesis tools – has introduced a new and exceptionally complex dimension to digital copyright. These systems are trained on enormous datasets of existing creative works, the use of which raises questions about whether training constitutes infringement. They generate outputs that may reproduce or closely resemble existing works, raising questions about the copyright status of AI-generated content. And they are deployed at a scale and speed that makes traditional enforcement mechanisms essentially unworkable.

Several major lawsuits have been filed in the United States against AI companies by writers, visual artists and news publishers challenging the use of their works in training datasets. The New York Times sued OpenAI and Microsoft in December 2023 alleging that its articles were used without authorization to train large language models. Getty Images filed suit in the United Kingdom and the United States against Stability AI, alleging that its image database was scraped for training without license. These cases are in early stages of litigation and their outcomes will shape the global legal framework for AI and copyright.

In India, the Copyright Act does not directly address AI training, AI-generated works or the ownership of copyright in machine-generated outputs. The Act requires a human author for copyright to subsist – Section 17 vests copyright in the author and the definition of “author” in Section 2(d) contemplates a natural person in all relevant contexts. As AI-generated content proliferates, the question of whether it attracts copyright protection and if so, in whom, will require either legislative attention or creative judicial interpretation. The Intellectual Property India office has not yet issued specific guidance on AI-generated works and the issue remains open.

Policy Directions and the Path Forward

Digital copyright law is at an inflection point globally and India is no exception. The growth of the domestic streaming market, the expansion of Indian content into global platforms and the emergence of Indian technology companies as major content distributors have increased the salience of these issues for domestic policy. At the same time, India’s large population of internet users, many accessing content through mobile-first, bandwidth-constrained connections, creates a legitimate public interest in affordable access that must be weighed in any policy calculus.

Several reform directions are under active discussion. The introduction of a “stay-down” obligation – requiring platforms not merely to remove notified infringing content but to prevent its re-upload – would significantly strengthen the position of rights holders and is consistent with the trend in European law. A mandatory licensing framework for digital music that extends to on-demand streaming services would resolve the gap exposed by the Tips Industries decision and reduce litigation over licensing terms. Clearer statutory guidance on AI-generated works would reduce uncertainty for both creators and technology companies.

The balance between rights protection and access is ultimately a legislative question. Courts can interpret and apply the framework that Parliament provides, but they cannot substitute their policy preferences for legislative choices. The continued evolution of digital copyright in India will depend on the willingness of the legislature to engage with these issues with the same seriousness and technical sophistication that they demand.

Conclusion

Digital copyright is not a sub specialty of intellectual property law – it is the environment in which most copyright claims now arise and most creative value is now generated. Online infringement, intermediary liability and safe harbours are the structural elements through which the law attempts to manage the tension between rights protection and the open information flows that the internet depends on.

India’s framework – anchored in the Copyright Act, 1957 as amended, the Information Technology Act, 2000 and an evolving body of judicial decisions – provides a workable but incomplete response to these challenges. The MySpace and UTV decisions have established important foundations for intermediary liability and injunctive relief. The Tips Industries decision has clarified, if not resolved, the licensing framework for digital music. The 2012 amendments have modernized the statutory architecture in important respects. But significant gaps remain – in the treatment of AI-generated content, in the adequacy of the notice-and-takedown mechanism for large-scale infringement and in the balance between platform immunity and rights holder protection.

For practitioners and rights holders operating in this space, the strategic imperative is to engage with the law, as it exists while monitoring the legislative and judicial developments that will shape what it becomes. Digital copyright is not a settled field – it is one of the most dynamic and consequential areas of law in the contemporary economy and its evolution will directly determine the conditions under which creativity, innovation and access to knowledge are possible in the digital age.

References

The Copyright Act, 1957 – https://copyright.gov.in/Documents/CopyrightRules1958.pdf
The Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012 – https://copyright.gov.in/Documents/Amendment_Act2012.pdf
The Information Technology Act, 2000 – https://www.meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/it_amendment_act2008%20(1).pdf
Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 – https://www.meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/Intermediary_Guidelines_and_Digital_Media_Ethics_Code_Rules-2021.pdf
MySpace Inc. v. Super Cassettes Industries Ltd., (2016) 236 DLT 478 (Delhi High Court)
Tips Industries Ltd. v. Wynk Music Ltd., (2019) Bombay High Court – https://bombayhighcourt.nic.in
UTV Software Communications Ltd. v. 1337X.to & Ors., CS(COMM) 724/2017 (Delhi High Court)
Christian Louboutin SAS v. Nakul Bajaj & Ors., (2018) 253 DLT 728 (Delhi High Court)
Amarnath Sehgal v. Union of India, (2005) 117 DLT 717 (Delhi High Court)
Viacom International Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012) – https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/10-3270/10-3270-2012-04-05.html
Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2016) – https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/14-1048/14-1048-2016-06-16.html
L’Oréal SA v. eBay International AG, Case C-324/09 (CJEU, 2011) – https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62009CJ0324
Poland v. European Parliament and Council, Case C-401/19 (CJEU, 2022) – https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62019CJ0401
EU Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (DSM Directive), 2019/790 – https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019L0790
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 1998 (US) – https://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf
U.S. Copyright Office – Section 512 Study Report (2020) – https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section512/section-512-full-report.pdf
TRIPS Agreement – https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf

Digital Copyright in the Internet Age: Online Infringement, Intermediary Liability and Safe Harbours

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